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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The Utah Court of Appeals created a new rule permitting an
award of alimony based upon a hypothetical standard of living not
enjoyed during the marriage.

This court should review and reverse
2

that

decision,

effecting

compliance

with

Utah

law

governing

alimony.
OFFICIM

RPPQZT OF Tffl? UTAH COURT OF A?FmX>$

The official decision of the Utah Court of Appeals was issued
on February 28, 1991.

It has been published in the Utah Advanced

Reporter where it is cited as Howel 1 v. Howel 1.
18 (Utah App. 1991).

155 Utah Adv. Rep.

For the convenience of the court, a copy of

each is attached hereto as Appendices "A" and "B".
Wm$DlQTI01t
A.

The Utah Court of Appeals decision was published February

28, 1991.
B.

No order respecting rehearing or extension of time to

petition

for

certiorari

has

been

made

and

as

none

has

been

requested.
C.

This petition for the writ of certiorari is submitted 28

days after the issuance of the opinion by the Utah Court of Appeals
which, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 48 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, is within the thirty (30) days after entry of
the decision by the Utah Court of Appeals.
D.

This court has jurisdiction to review the decision in this

matter pursuant to the provisions of sections 78-2-2(3)(a) and 782-2(5) of the Utah Code (1990).
CONTROLLING STATUTE
When a
rendered,
it equitable
children,
Utah Code

Decree
of
Divorce
is
the court may include
in
orders relating
to the
property,
and
parties.
§30-3-5(1) (1990)
3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a divorce action.
14,

1956.

The husband

The parties were married on October

began working

as a pilot

Airlines shortly after the parties were married.

for Western

When the parties

separated and the husband filed for divorce, in November of 1986,
his income had been between $5,500.00 and $5,600. 00 per month for
the

five

(5) previous

years.

The defendant

had

little

work

experience during the marriage of the parties and raised five (5)
children.

Four of them were emancipated by the time of trial.

After the divorce action was filed, Western Airlines was acquired
by Delta Airlines and husband' s income rose substantially so that
by the time of trial, it was approximately $10,000.00 per month.
(Slip op. at 1-2, 155 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18-19).
The trial court determined that the standard of living of the
parties

during the course of their marriage should be set by

examining the five (5) years prior to the divorce, during which
time the plaintiff earned $5,500.00 to $5,600.00 per month. (Slip
op. at 1-2, 155 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18-19).
Two members of the panel in the Utah Court of Appeals held
that the trial

court abused its discretion in pinpointing the

parties' standard of living at the time of separation.

Although

the court professed to apply the standards for alimony awards set
by this court, that is, by examining the financial condition and
needs of the recipient spouse; the recipient' s ability to produce
income; the ability of the payor spouse to provide income, Davis
Davis.

v.

749 P. 2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988); and, the standard of living
4

prior to the divorce, Gardner

v.

Gardner.

1988); the court of appeals did not do so.

748 P. 2d 1076 (Utah
The decision of the

court of appeals, in effect, requires the trial court to project a
standard of living which never existed during the marriage; that
is, what the husband could now afford. (Slip op. at 3-7, 155 Utah
Adv. Rep. 19-21. )
This change in Utah law was identified by the dissenting
judge, Judge Bench, who correctly pointed out the error of the
other two judges when he observed:
Defendant seeks to benefit
from plaint!ff
s
raise
by mistakenly,
and
unnecessarily,
claiming
that
the raise
entitled
her
to
alimony based upon a hypothetical
standard of
living
to be calculated
from plaintiff
s new
annual salary of $120,000, an income to which
she has never grown accustomed.
In other
words, defendant
claims that her
relevant
standard of living is the unknown standard of
living
that she might have enjoyed were the
parties not terminating their marriage. (Slip
op. at 10, 155 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22).
ARGUMENT

As Judge Bench correctly pointed out in his dissent, the
majority opinion creates a new standard for an award of alimony in
Utah, contrary to that articulated in English
409

(Utah

1977),

and restated

in Davis.

v. English.
where

565 P. 2d

this

court

articulated the basic rule that governs an award of alimony in
Utah; that is, that the trial court must consider the financial
condition and needs of the recipient spouse, the recipient7 s
ability to produce income, the ability of the payor spouse to
provide support, at a level enjoyed during the marriage and to
prevent the wife from becoming a public charge. (565 P. 2d at 411. )
5

This court somewhat modified that standard in Gardner

v.

Gardner.

748 P. 2d 1076 (Utah 1988), when it declared that an alimony award
should, to the extent possible, equalize the parties' respective
standards of living and maintain them as close as possible to that
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage.
In the instant case, two members of the panel of the Utah
Court of Appeals, when faced with the circumstance of a husband
whose income doubled during the pendency of the divorce, rejected
those alimony determination guidelines and have, without authority,
articulated a new rule.

This is contrary to the decision of the

court of appeals itself inffrf/jfanfrauahv>
(Utah App.

ffxidepbaucrh.

786 P. 2d 241

1990), where the court declared that the standard of

living during the marriage is the basis for reexamination of an
alimony award.
In this case, the trial judge set alimony at roughly one-third
(1/3) of the amount received by the parties during their marriage. l
The majority of the panel of the court of appeals did not accept
that ruling and has ordered, as the dissenting judge discerned, the
trial judge to award alimony for a standard of living that never
existed.

That is an award based on income of $10,000.00 a month

rather than $5, 500. 00 a month.

By so ruling, the two judges of the

panel seek to rewrite the law of alimony in Utah in a fashion that
is contrary to the guidelines articulated by this court.

This

The trial court awarded $1,800.00 of husband9 s earnings as alimony.
This would rationalize
to a division
of the income of the parties
as
follows:
1/3 to taxes,
1/2 the balance to the husband, 1/2 the
balance to the wife, which directly
follows
the Gardner mandate.
6

action renders the decision in conflict with prior Utah decisions
and substantially departs from the law governing the establishment
of alimony, which requires this court in the exercise of proper
judicial supervision, to review that decision.

This

court

should

grant

a writ

of

certiorari

and

after

appropriate examination, vacate the decision of the majority of the
panel

of the Utah Court

decision

in

articulated

light

of

the

of Appeals,
governing

and remand the case for
authorities

as

cited

and

by Judge Bench in his dissent.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this

day of

9^2^

^ A

/

1991.

AVID S. DOLOWITZ
Attorney for Petitioner

7
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APPENDIX

A.

Howell v. Howell, No.
1991).

B.

Howell v. Howell. 155 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah App. 1991).

C.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
Howell (No. D87-4343).

D.

Decree of Divorce, Howell (No. D87-4343).
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COVER SHEET
CASE TITLE:
Walter James Howell,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Barbara Joyce Howell,
Defendant and Appellant.
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(Argued)
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TRIAL JUDGE:
Honorable Frank G. Noel
February 28, 1991. OPINION (For Publication).
This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and
the Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is
now ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the
district court herein be, and the same is, affirmed in
part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings
in accordance with the views expressed in the opinion filed
herein.
Opinion of the Court by PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Judge;
REGNAL W. GARFF, Judge, concurs. RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge,
concurrs in part and dissents in part, by separate opinion.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of February, 1991, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing OPINION was deposited in
the United States mail or personally delivered to each of the
above parties.

Deputy Clerk/7
/
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* vx / MaryT. Noonan
OPINION
Clerk of the Court
(For PublicationOltahCourt of Appeals

Walter James Howell,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No- 890596-CA
v.
F I L E D
(February 28, 1991)

Barbara Joyce Howell,
Defendant and Appellant.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Frank G. Noel
Attorneys:

Paul H. Liapis, Helen E. Christian, and Kim M.
Luhn, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
David S. Dolowitz, Michael S. Evans, and M. Joy
Douglas, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Greenwood.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Defendant, Barbara Joyce Howell, appeals from a divorce
decree's award of alimony and division of equity in a
California home. We affirm the property division but reverse
and remand as to alimony.
FACTS
Defendant and plaintiff, Walter James Howell, were married
on October 14, 1956. Plaintiff began working as a pilot for
Western Airlines shortly after the parties married. He
continued to be employed as a pilot with Western, later taken
over by Delta Airlines, throughout the parties' marriage. The
parties had five children, four of whom were emancipated at the
time of trial. The parties had marital difficulties on and off
for a number of years and separated in November 1986. At that
time, plaintiffs gross income was between $5500 and $5600 per
month, and had been at that level for the prior five years.
Western Airlines experienced financial problems prior to the
takeover by Delta Airlines. As a result of negotiations

between Western and its pilots, plaintiff received virtually no
pay raises between 1981 and 1986, despite increases in the cost
of living. Both parties testified that their family finances
were strained during that time period.
Plaintiff filed for divorce in November 1987. At the time
of trial, December 1988, his gross monthly income had increased
to $10,120. Plaintiff's financial declaration indicated
monthly expenses of $7960, which included $2400 for alimony and
child support, $372 for vacations, and $633 for attorney fees.
During the parties' marriage, defendant was a homemaker
and had worked only part time at unskilled labor jobs. At the
time of trial defendant earned $649.80 per month, though that
job was only temporary and terminated in December 1988. She
testified at trial that she had monthly expenses totaling
$5021.x
The parties owned homes in Utah and California, as well as
real property in Texas. Plaintiff testified that the Utah home
had little, if any, equity, while the California home would
yield substantial equity. Plaintiff wanted to sell all the
properties and divide the net proceeds. Defendant testified
she would prefer to live in the California home.
After trial, the court entered findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and a decree of divorce on May 12, 1989.
In its findings, the court states its belief that "the income
level of $5500 reflects the income level and living standards
of the parties during the last five years of their lives
together." The court found that defendant was capable of
earning $625 per month, and that plaintiff had income of
$10,000 per month. The findings further state that "[t]he
court has determined in setting alimony that while $5,500.00
per month represents the living standards of the parties in the
last 5 years of the marriage, when the parties resided
together, the ability of the plaintiff to pay alimony is based
upon his present income of $10,000.00 per month." Defendant
was awarded $1800 per month alimony and $1363 per month child
support for the parties' then sixteen year-old child, based on
the child support guidelines then in effect. The court ordered
1. Defendant filed an earlier declaration of monthly expenses
totaling $4464.62, but included no expenses for real property
taxes or insurance, indicating that they were then unknown.
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that all of the real property, including the California home, be
sold and the net proceeds divided equally between the parties.
On appeal, defendant asserts (1) the parties' standard of
living, for purposes of determining alimony, should be based on
that at the time of trial; (2) the alimony awarded is
insufficient; and (3) the trial court should have taken into
consideration the tax consequences of selling the California
home.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining
alimony and property distribution in divorce cases, and will be
upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of
discretion is demonstrated. Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331,
1333 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Findings of fact in divorce appeals
are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review such
that "due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Utah R. Civ.
P. 52(a); Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah Ct. App.
1989). Conclusions of law, however, are reviewed for
correctness and given no special deference on appeal. Bountiful
v. Rilev, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989); Smith v. Smith, 793
P.2d 407, 409 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
ALIMONY
Defendant claims that the alimony award would have been
higher if the trial court had considered the parties' standard
of living at the time of trial rather than when the parties
separated, approximately two years earlier. Additionally,
defendant claims alimony should have been higher because of the
disparity in the parties' income, length of the marriage, and
the parties* respective earning abilities and expenses. We
consider first the applicable standard of living question.
The value of marital property is determined as of the time
of the divorce decree or trial. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d
1218, 1222-23 (Utah 1980). See also Beraer v. Berqer, 713 P.2d
695, 697 (Utah 1985). The reason for the rule is that "[b]y the
very nature of a property division, the marital estate is
evaluated according to what property exists at the time the
marriage is terminated." Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326,
328 (Utah 1980). Courts can, however, in the exercise of their
equitable powers, use a different date, such as the date of
separation, if one party has "acted obstructively, . . . "
Peck
v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

890596-CA
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No cases in Utah or elsewhere, that we or counsel have
discovered, have specifically addressed the question of when a
couple's "standard of living" should be determined for the
purpose of calculating alimony, be it separation or trial or
some other time. Most speak only of the standard of living
during marriage. See Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1205
(Utah 1983). "Standard of living" is defined as "a minimum of
necessities, comforts, or luxuries that is essential to
maintaining a person in customary or proper status or
circumstances." Webster's Third New International Dictionary
2223 (1986). "An alimony award should, to the extent possible,
equalize the parties' respective post-divorce living standards
. . . ." Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct. App.
1980) .
In this case, the parties were separated for approximately
one year before plaintiff filed for divorce. About one year
later, trial was held. We note that a separation of two years
before trial in a divorce action is certainly not unusual.
During that two-year period, plaintiff's income doubled because
of the successful takeover of Western Airlines by Delta
Airlines. Plaintiff's ability to take advantage of that change
was at least in part a result of having persevered during the
lean times, as did his wife and children. The impact of the
salary increase on the parties' standard of living, however, was
certainly affected by the fact that it was used to maintain
separate living arrangements.
We believe it is consistent with the goal of equalizing the
parties' post divorce status to look to the standard of living
existing at or near the time of trial in determining alimony.
This is consonant with the treatment of both marital property
and child support and is better designed to equip both parties
to go forward with their separate lives with relatively equal
odds. It is further justified because any future changes in
alimony are limited to instances where a material change of
circumstances has occurred. Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugh, 786
P.2d 241, 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In so holding, we agree
with the dissenting opinion that determining standard of living
is a "fact-sensitive, subjective task." We disagree, however,
that standard of living is determined by actual expenses alone.
Those expenses may be necessarily lower than needed to maintain
an appropriate standard of living for various reasons,
including, possibly, lack of income. As Webster says, standard
of living includes "customary or proper status" considering the
parties' circumstances. Those circumstances should be evaluated
at the time of trial and, contrary to the dissent, can properly

890596-CA
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address what situation would have existed if the parties had not
separated earlier. In this case, the post-separation
substantial increase in plaintiff's income was akin to deferred
income. In light of the facts of this case, we conclude that
the trial court erred in looking at the pre-separation standard
of living in setting alimony, but should have instead considered
the standard of living "during the marriage" up to the time of
trial. In so concluding we do not intend to establish a rigid
rule which must be followed in all domestic cases, but
acknowledge that trial courts have discretion to determine the
standard of living which existed during the marriage after
consideration of all relevant facts and equitable principles.
In this case, it was inequitable and an abuse of discretion to
pinpoint standard of living as of the time of the parties'
separation.
We now turn to defendant's argument that the court did not
properly consider all relevant factors, resulting in an
unjustifiably low alimony award. Trial courts must consider the
following factors in setting alimony: (1) the financial
condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (2) the recipient's
ability to produce income; and (3) the ability of the payor
spouse to provide support. Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 649
(Utah 1988). Utah cases have stated that the purpose of alimony
is to prevent the receiving spouse "from becoming a public
charge" and to maintain the standard of living enjoyed during
the marriage, to the extent possible. Fletcher, 615 P.2d at
1223. Therefore, trial courts should first, determine the
financial needs and resources for both parties, by examining the
three factors enumerated. Second, the court should set alimony
as permitted by those parameters, to approximate the parties'
standard of living during the marriage as closely as possible.
It follows that if the payor spouse's resources are adequate,
alimony need not be limited to provide for only basic needs, but
should also consider the recipient spouse's "station in life."
Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1978). In Gardner v.
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court
reviewed an alimony award after a long-term marriage. The court
found that the alimony award in that situation should, "to the
extent possible, equalize the parties' respective standards of
living and maintain them at a level as close as possible to that
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage." 1£. at 1081.
See also Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 103 (Utah 1986); Olson
v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985).
The trial court must make findings on all material issues.
Failure to do so constitutes reversible error, unless pertinent
facts in the record are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment." Andersen
v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

890596-CA
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Utah's appellate courts have considered the appropriateness
of alimony after a long term marriage, where the wife (usually)
has worked primarily in the home, has limited job skills, and is
in her late forties or fifties. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076;
Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333. In Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072
(Utah 1985), the supreme court found alimony awarded inadequate
to allow the wife a standard of living even approaching that
experienced during the marriage, and described the marriage as
follows:
During most of the marriage, with the
full consent and support of her husband,
[the wife] devoted her time to raising
their four children and donating her
services to various social service
organizations. . . .
It is entirely
unrealistic to assume that a woman in
her mid-50's with no substantial work
experience or training will be able to
enter the job market and support herself
in anything even resembling the style in
which the couple had been living.
Id. at 1075.
In this case the court made findings as to both
plaintiff's and defendant's gross incomes. It did not,
however, make the required finding as to defendant's financial
needs, although defendant testified to monthly expenses of
approximately $5,000. Child support set pursuant to child
support guidelines at $1363, plus alimony of $1800, plus
defendant's potential salary as determined by the court of
$645, yields total gross monthly income of $3808 for defendant
and her son. Plaintiff, after deducting child support and
alimony, has gross monthly income of $6837. When his child
support obligation ceases, approximately fifteen months after
the decree, he will have gross monthly income of $8200 in
comparison to defendant's $2445.
Defendant fits the profile
described in Jones and other cases: she is approximately fifty
years old, has minimal marketable job skills, and has spent
most of the thirty plus years of the parties' marriage raising
and caring for their five children and their home, presumably
2. "If courts award child support in lieu of permanent
alimony, they may fail to anticipate the financial impact on
the remaining family as each child reaches age 18 and his or
her award terminates." March 1990 Utah Task Force on Gender
and Justice Report to the Utah Judicial Council 38.
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with the concurrence of plaintiff. Her likelihood of achieving
significant salary levels in the future is slim. The alimony
set by the court does not come close to equalizing the parties'
standard of living as of the time of the divorce, but allows
plaintiff a two to four times advantage.3 We, therefore, hold
that the alimony amount set by the court was clearly
erroneous.
We reverse and remand to the trial court on the issue of
alimony, for findings as to defendant's financial needs, the
parties' standard of living at the time of the trial, and for
adjustment of the amount of alimony to better equalize the
parties' abilities to go forward with their respective lives.
TAX CONSIDERATIONS
Defendant also urges that the court erred by failing to
consider the tax consequences of selling the California home.
Defendant produced an expert witness at trial who testified as
to the possible tax ramifications of the sale. He discussed
capital gains tax, but said the amount would depend on the
sales price, and that it might be avoided pursuant to tax
regulations. He testified that taxes might be deferred, or
"rolled over," but could not say with any certainty how the IRS
would rule. There is no abuse of discretion if a court refuses
to speculate about hypothetical future tax consequences of a
property division made pursuant to a divorce. Alexander v.
Alexander, 737 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah 1987). Tax consequences in
this case were speculative as to whether they could be avoided
or delayed, and as to amount. The court heard testimony and
evidence regarding possible tax implications, but did not err
in refusing to adjust property distribution because of those
theoretical consequences.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's property distribution order
but reverse as to the alimony award and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

3. Exact mathematical equality of income is not required, but
sufficient parity to allow both parties to be on equal footing
financially as of the time of the divorce is required.
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I^gnal W. Garff,

BENCH, Judge (concurring in part, dissenting in part):
I agree with the majority opinion's treatment of the "tax
considerations." I also agree that this case must be remanded
for entry of appropriate findings as to the needs of defendant
for alimony and the ability of plaintiff to pay alimony. I
respectfully disagree with the majority, however, as to how the
parties' standard of living during the marriage impacts the
alimony computations. The majority rules, as a matter of law,
that in computing the alimony award, the trial court should
have considered a hypothetical standard of living as if the
parties were living together at the time of trial rather than
their actual standard of living enjoyed prior to separation.*
There are no cases addressing when the parties' standard
or living i s determined because a "standard of living" cannot,
as the majo rity implies, be quantified by the trial court. It
is not like marital property which is capable of objective
valuation a t a given time. Nor is it capable of being
calculated based on set figures of income as are child support
payments. Determining the parties' standard of living during
marriage is a fact-sensitive, subjective task that requires a
trial court to look at the totality of the parties' financial
1. Contrary to the majority's assertion, the t rial court did
not "pinpoint" the parties' st andard of living as of the time
of separation. The trial cour t took the parties' average
income over a five-year period prior to separat ion and as sumed
that their average income was their "standard o f living."
While it is clear that the tri al court erred in assuming that
income alone establishes a sta ndard of living, it may not be
said that it made the mistake of pinpointing th at standar d of
living. The majority therefor e errs in finding that the trial
court abused its discretion wh en the trial cour t did not even
make the mistake that the majo rity is accusing it of maki ng.

PQORQfi-rZX

circumstances during the marriage. The Utah Supreme Court has
therefore established objective factors that must be considered
by the trial court when it determines an award of alimony.
"The most important function of alimony
is to provide support for the wife as
nearly as possible at the standard of
living she enjoyed during marriage, and
to prevent the wife from becoming a
public charge." English v. English, 565
P.2d at 411. With this purpose in mind,
the Court in English articulated three
factors that must be considered in
fixing a reasonable alimony award:
[1] the financial condition and needs of
the wife;
[2] the ability of the wife to produce a
sufficient income for herself; and
[3] the ability of the husband to
provide support.
Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). Accord Paffel
v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100-01 (Utah 1986) (failure to consider
these factors is an abuse of discretion); Olson v. Olson, 704
P.2d 564, 566-67 (Utah 1985) (an appellate court will not
disturb a trial court's ruling if these factors are adequately
addressed).
As is apparent from the foregoing quotation, the receiving
spouse*s previous standard of living is not an independent
factor to be quantified and incorporated into a formula for
calculating alimony. Rather, it is a frame of reference for
determining the reasonableness of the alimony award. See
generally, 2 H. Clark, Jr., The Law Of Domestic Relations In
The United States § 17.5(8) (2d ed. 1987). In the present
case, we are not concerned with the risk of defendant becoming
a public charge given the apparent ability of plaintiff to
cover defendant's basic needs. The question is how much
additional support above defendant's basic needs should be
granted. The parties' standard of living prior to separation
helps to establish what would be reasonable by showing the
lifestyle to which the parties have grown accustomed.
Defendant seeks to benefit from plaintiff's raise by
mistakenly, and unnecessarily, claiming that the raise entitled
her to alimony based upon a hypothetical standard of living to
be calculated from plaintiff's new annual salary of $120,000,
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an income to which she has never grown accustomed.
In other
words, defendant claims that her relevant standard of living is
the unknown standard of living that she might have enjoyed were
the parties not terminating their marriage. Since any attempt
to determine a standard of living for two separated parties as
if they were not separated would be purely speculative, the
majority's ruling is judicially unworkable. There is no
rational way of knowing how the parties might have utilized the
increased income had they remained together. Would they have
bought a new car, a new house, or maybe a vacation timeshare?
Or would they have simply saved the money for retirement?
Since a couple's standard of living is determined in large part
by how they spend their resources, a trial court could do
nothing but speculate about the possible standard of living if
the marital relationship had continued beyond separation.
Not only is such an approach unworkable, it is not needed
if the traditional approach outlined in English is followed.
In the present case, the trial court clearly failed to
determine defendant's financial condition and needs based on
the expenses she claimed to be necessary to maintain the
standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage. See, e.g.,
Olson, 704 P.2d at 567 ("to maintain the standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage, the living expenses of the wife
and minor children would be $4,200 per month").
Defendant presented to the trial court evidence of the
expenses which she claimed would be necessary to maintain her
standard of living, but the trial court made no findings

2. Defendant claims, and the majority seems to agree, that
defendant is entitled to a larger amount of alimony because she
"persevered during the lean times." Such an argument does not,
however, justify an amount in excess of the needs substantiated
by the receiving spouse. English, 565 P.2d at 412. The
majority's summary conclusion that the income was "akin to
deferred income," is totally unsupported. While the parties
may have perservered at Western Airlines during the lean times,
there is no evidence that there was any commitment from Western
that plaintiffs income would increase if and because he stayed
with the airline.
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thereon.J The trial court should have reviewed the expenses
claimed and determined which expenses could be deemed
reasonable in light of the standard of living she had enioved
prior to the separation. See, e.g.. Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075
(the couple had enjoyed a "very comfortable lifestyle," alimony
award of $1,000 per month was insufficient for wife to
"maintain anything even approaching the standard of living she
enjoyed during the marriage"). Her reasonable expenses should
have then been offset by her own resources, i.e., any
investment income and her own wage-earning capacity. Only then
could the trial court have made a finding as to defendant's
needs.
The trial court should have then gone through the same
analysis as to the plaintiffs needs and resources in order to
determine his ability to pay. Again, the reasonableness of his
claimed expenses should be reviewed with the parties* prior
standard of living in mind. The trial court should have then
determined whether plaintiffs resources exceeded his
reasonable needs. At this point the trial court should have,
and in fact did, consider the impact of the dramatic increase
in plaintiffs income. If plaintiff had not received the
raise, then his ability to pay would be approximately $4,500
less per month, in which case neither party would likely be
able to enjoy a standard of living anywhere near their previous
standard. Inasmuch as plaintiffs raise has increased his
ability to pay, defendant will be directly benefitted without
resort to a hypothetical standard of living to which she had
not grown accustomed.
After determining what resources were available to the
parties to meet their own reasonable expenses, the trial court
should have considered any imbalance in the prospective
standards of living if the parties were left to support
themselves with their own resources. If it were apparent that
defendant could not maintain her previous standard of living
with her own resources, and that the plaintiff with his
dramatically increased income could maintain a higher standard
3. Defendant's actual expenses at the time of trial were
likely greatly diminished due to her limited income at the
time. She therefore correctly sought to present not only her
actual expenses during the separation, but also the expenses
she claimed would be necessary to maintain or, in many cases
return to, the standard of living she enjoyed prior to
separation.
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of living, then the trial court could have awarded alimony to
raise the standard of living of the defendant. Davis v. Davis.
749 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988) ("the ultimate test of the
propriety of an alimony award is whether, given all of these
factors, the party receiving alimony will be unable to support
him- or herself 'as nearly as possible at the standard of
living . . . enjoyed during the marriage,•" quoting English,
565 P.2d at 411). 9
Inasmuch as the trial court failed to follow the foregoing
approach, the court abused its discretion in making the alimony
award. I therefore concur with the majority that this case
must be remanded to allow the trial court to properly consider
the established factors and make appropriate findings.
However, since plaintiffs raise will be fully considered when
his ability to pay alimony is determined, I believe there is no
need to depart from the established criteria for determining
alimony. The parties' standard of living need not, and should
not, be extrapolated so as to include speculations about what
their standard of living might have been at the time of trial
if they had not separated. I therefore respectfully dissent
from the majority opinion's legal ruling on that point.

^Russell W. Bench, Judge

4, The alimony award, however, need not be large enough to
maintain the receiving spouse at the standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage if that amount of alimony would lower the
standard of living of the paying spouse below that of the
receiving spouse. Alimony may only raise the standard of
living of the receiving spouse until it is roughly equal to
that of the paying spouse. It is in this sense that alimony
should seek -to the extent possible, [to] equalize the parties*
respective post-divorce living standards." Rasband v. Rasband,
752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
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Gillmor's January 25 affidavits or, in denying
the motion to reconsider, disregarded those
affidavits altogether
Because the trial court granted summary
judgment prematurely under the applicable
procedural rules, and because nothing in the
record indicates that the court corrected its
procedural error when that error was called to
its attention, the summary judgment is set
aside. See Graco Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc.
v Ironwood Exploration, Inc , 735 P.2d 62,
62-63 (Utah 1987); K O. v. Demson, 748
P.2d 588, 591 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). We
reverse and remand to the trial court for
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each
party shall pay his or its own costs.
Pamela T Greenwood, Judge
WE CONCUR
Russell W Bench, Judge
Judith M Billings, Judge
1 Gillmor correctly claims that there is a disputed
issue of fact concerning the location of the record
boundary between his property and that of appellees, as is reflected in his affidavit and those of the
surveyor This issue, however, is not material with
respect to the question of whether appellees have
satisfied the requirements for adverse possession,
which was the sole ground for their summary judg
ment motion Indeed, the summary judgment
motion starts with the assumption that the Garhcks
and Pelton do in fact occupy property to which
Gillmor holds record title The true location of the
record boundary has no bearing on the adverse
possession claim However, in the event appellees'
adverse possession defense fails, they must address
Gillmor's boundary line claim
2 Utah Code Ann §78 12 12 (1987) requires
continuous occupation and payment of taxes on
land adversely claimed
In no case shall adverse possession be
considered established under the provisions of any section of this code, unless
it shall be shown that the land had been
occupied and claimed for the period of
seven years continuously, and that the
party, his predecessors and grantors
have paid all taxes which have been
levied and assessed upon such land
according to law
Gillmor's memoranda and affidavits apparently
dispute both the seven vear continuous occupation
and tax payment for the Garhcks and/or Pelton
3 Although Gillmor did not include procedural
error as a basis for appeal in his brief, he did argue
the issue before the trial court We consider the
procedural issue on appeal for practical reasons we
are unable to determine from the record before us
what the court actually considered in granting the
summary judgment and denying the motion for
reconsideration This is similar to those cases where
we remand for findings because we are unable to
discern from the record how the court resolved
material issues See Acton \ Deliran 131 P 2d 996,
999 (Utah 1987), State v Lovegren, 798 P 2d 767,
770-71 (Utah Ct App 1990)
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OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Defendant, Barbara Joyce Howell, appeals
from a divorce decree's award of alimony and
division of equity in a California home We
affirm the property division but reverse and
remand as to alimony
FACTS
Defendant and plaintiff, Walter James
Howell, were married on October 14, 1956
Plaintiff began working as a pilot for Western
Airlines shortly after the parties married He
continued to be employed as a pilot with
Western, later taken over by Delta Airlines,
throughout the parties' marriage The parties
had five children, four of whom were emancipated at the time of trial The parties had
marital difficulties on and off for a number of
years and separated in November 1986 At
that time, plaintiff's gross income was
between $5500 and S5600 per month, and had
been at that level for the prior five years
Western Airlines experienced financial prob
lems prior to the takeover b> Delta Airlines
As a result of negotiations between Western
and its pilots, plaintiff received virtually no
pay raises between 1981 and 1986, despite
increases in the cost of living Both parties
testified that their family finances were strained during that time period
Plaintiff filed for divorce in November
1987 At the time of trial, December 1988, his
gross monthly income had increased to
$10,120 Plaintiff's financial declaration indicated monthly expenses of $7960, which included $2400 for alimony and child support,
$372 for vacations, and $633 for attorney fees

During the parties' marriage, defendant was
a homemaker and had worked only part time
at unskilled labor jobs. At the time of trial
defendant earned $649.80 per month, though
that job was only temporary and terminated in
December 1988. She testified at trial that she
had monthly expenses totaling $5021. 1
The parties owned homes in Utah and California, as well as real property in Texas.
Plaintiff testified that the Utah home had
little, if any, equity, while the California home
would yield substantial equity. Plaintiff
wanted to sell all the properties and divide the
net proceeds. Defendant testified she would
prefer to live in the California home.
After trial, the court entered findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and a decree of
divorce on May 12, 1989. In its findings, the
court states its belief that "the income level of
$5500 reflects the income level and living standards of the parties during the last five years
of their lives together." The court found that
defendant was capable of earning $625 per
month, and that plaintiff had income of
$10,000 per month. The findings further state
that "[t]he court has determined in setting
alimony that while $5,500.00 per month represents the living standards of the parties in
the last 5 years of the marriage, when the
parties resided together, the ability of the
plaintiff to pay alimony is based upon his
present income of $10,000.00 per month."
Defendant was awarded $1800 per month
alimony and $1363 per month child support
for the parties' then sixteen year-old child,
based on the child support guidelines then in
effect. The court ordered that all of the real
property, including the California home, be
sold and the net proceeds divided equally
between the parties.
On appeal, defendant asserts (1) the parties'
standard of living, for purposes of determining alimony, should be based on that at the
time of trial; (2) the alimony awarded is insufficient; and (3) the trial court should have
taken into consideration the tax consequences
of selling the California home.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Trial courts have considerable discretion in
determining alimony and property distribution
in divorce cases, and will be upheld on appeal
unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Rasband v. Rasband,
752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Findings of fact in divorce appeals are subject
to the clearly erroneous standard of review
such that "due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P.
52(a); Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). Conclusions of law,
however, are reviewed for correctness and
given no special deference on appeal. Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989);

Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
ALIMOiNY
Defendant claims that the alimony award
would have been higher if the trial court had
considered the parties' standard of living at
the time of trial rather than when the parties
separated, approximately two years earlier.
Additionally, defendant claims alimony should
have been higher because of the disparity in
the parties' income, length of the marriage,
and the parties' respective earning abilities
and expenses. We consider first the applicable
standard of living question.
The value of marital property is determined
as of the time of the divorce decree or trial. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222-23
(Utah 1980). See also Berger v. Berger, 713
P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985). The reason for the
rule is that "[b]y the very nature of a property
division, the marital estate is evaluated according to what property exists at the time the
marriage is terminated." Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980). Courts
can, however, in the exercise of their equitable
powers, use a different date, such as the date
of separation, if one party has "acted obstructively, ..." Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1052
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
No cases in Utah or elsewhere, that we or
counsel have discovered, have specifically
addressed the question of when a couple's
"standard of living" should be determined for
the purpose of calculating alimony, be it separation or trial or some other time. Most
speak only of the standard of living during
marriage. See Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d
1201, 1205 (Utah 1983). "Standard of living"
is defined as "a minimum of necessities,
comforts, or luxuries that is essential to maintaining a person in customary or proper
status or circumstances." Webster's Third
New International Dictionary 2223 (1986).
"An alimony award should, to the extent
possible, equalize the parties' respective postdivorce living standards ...." Rasband v.
Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct. App.
1980).
In this case, the parties were separated for
approximately one year before plaintiff filed
for divorce. About one year later, trial was
held. We note that a separation of two years
before trial in a divorce action is certainly not
unusual. During that two-year period, plaintiff's income doubled because of the successful takeover of Western Airlines by Delta
Airlines. Plaintiff's ability to take advantage
of that change was at least in part a result of
having persevered during the lean times, as did
his wife and children. The impact of the salary
increase on the parties' standard of living,
however, was certainly affected by the fact
that it was used to maintain separate living
arrangements.

We believe it is consistent with the goal of
equalizing the parties' post divorce status to
look to the standard of living existing at or
near the time of trial in determining alimony.
This is consonant with the treatment of both
marital property and child support and is
better designed to equip both parties to go
forward with their separate lives with relatively
equal odds. It is further justified because any
future changes in alimony are limited to instances where a material change of circumstances has occurred. Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah Ct. App.
1990). In so holding, we agree with the dissenting opinion that determining standard of
living is a "fact-sensitive, subjective task."
We disagree, however, that standard of living
is determined by actual expenses alone. Those
expenses may be necessarily lower than needed
to maintain an appropriate standard of living
for various reasons, including, possibly, lack
of income. As Webster says, standard of living
includes "customary or proper status" considering the parties' circumstances. Those circumstances should be evaluated at the time of
trial and, contrary to the dissent, can properly
address what situation would have existed if
the parties had not separated earlier. In this
case, the post-separation substantial increase
in plaintiff's income was akin to deferred
income. In light of the facts of this case, we
conclude that the trial court erred in looking
at the pre-separation standard of living in
setting alimony, but should have instead considered the standard of living "during the
marriage" up to the time of trial. In so concluding we do not intend to establish a rigid
rule which must be followed in all domestic
cases, but acknowledge that trial courts have
discretion to determine the standard of living
which existed during the marriage after consideration of all relevant facts and equitable
principles. In this case, it was inequitable and
an abuse of discretion to pinpoint standard of
living as of the time of the parties' separation.
We now turn to defendant's argument that
the court did not properly consider all relevant
factors, resulting in an unjustifiably low
alimony award. Trial courts must consider the
following factors in setting alimony: (1) the
financial condition and needs of the recipient
spouse; (2) the recipient's ability to produce
income; and (3) the ability of the payor spouse
to provide support. Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d
647, 649 (Utah 1988). Utah cases have stated
that the purpose of alimony is to prevent the
receiving spouse "from becoming a public
charge" and to maintain the standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage, to the extent
possible. Fletcher, 615 P.2d at 1223. Therefore, trial courts should first, determine the
financial needs and resources for both parties,
by examining the three factors enumerated.
Second, the court should set alimony as permitted by those parameters, to approximate

the parties' standard of living during the
marriage as closely as possible. It follows that
if the payor spouse's resources are adequate,
alimony need not be limited to provide for
only basic needs, but should also consider the
recipient spouse's "station in life." Gramme v.
Gramme, 587 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1978). In
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah
1988), the Utah Supreme Court reviewed an
alimony award after a long-term marriage.
The court found that the alimony award in
that situation should, "to the extent possible,
equalize the parties' respective standards of
living and maintain them at a level as close as
possible to that standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage." Id. at 1081. See also Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 103 (Utah
1986); Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566
(Utah 1985).
The trial court must make findings on all
material issues. Failure to do so constitutes
reversible error, unless pertinent facts in the
record are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable
of supporting only a finding in favor of the
judgment." Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d
476, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Utah's appellate courts have considered the
appropriateness of alimony after a long term
marriage, where the wife (usually) has worked
primarily in the home, has limited job skills,
and is in her late forties or fifties. Gardner,
748 P.2d 1076; Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333.
In Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985),
the supreme court found alimony awarded
inadequate to allow the wife a standard of
living even approaching that experienced
during the marriage, and described the marriage as follows:
During most; of the marriage, with
the full consent and support of her
husband, [the wife] devoted her
time to raising their four children
and donating her services to various
social service organizations.... It is
entirely unrealistic to assume that a
woman in her mid-50's with no
substantial work experience or training will be able to enter the job
market and support herself in anything even resembling the style in
which the couple had been living.
W. at 1075.
In this case the court made findings as to
both plaintiff's and defendant's gross
incomes. It did not, however, make the required finding as to defendant's financial needs,
although defendant testified to monthly expenses of approximately $5,000. Child support
set pursuant to child support guidelines at
$1363, plus alimony of $1800, plus defendant's potential salary as determined by the
court of $645, yields total gross monthly
income of $3808 for defendant and her son.
Plaintiff, after deducting child support and

ilimony, has gross monthly income of $6837.
When his child support obligation ceases,
ipproximately fifteen months after the decree,
ie will have gross monthly income of $8200 in
comparison to defendant's $2445.2 Defendant
Its the profile described in Jones and other
:ases: she is approximately fifty years old, has
ninimal marketable job skills, and has spent
nost of the thirty plus years of the parties'
narriage raising and caring for their five chidren and their home, presumably with the
concurrence of plaintiff. Her likelihood of
ichieving significant salary levels in the future
s slim. The alimony set by the court does not
:ome close to equalizing the parties' standard
)f living as of the time of the divorce, but
dlows plaintiff a two to four times advantage. 3
We, therefore, hold that the alimony amount
>et by the court was clearly erroneous.
We reverse and remand to the trial court on
he issue of alimony, for findings as to defeldant's financial needs, the parties' standard
)f living at the time of the trial, and for adjistment of the amount of alimony to better
equalize the parties' abilities to go forward
vith their respective lives.
TAX CONSIDERATIONS
Defendant also urges that the court erred by
ailing to consider the tax consequences of
elling the California home. Defendant prodiced an expert witness at trial who testified as
o the possible tax ramifications of the sale,
l e discussed capital gains tax, but said the
imount would depend on the sales price, and
hat it might be avoided pursuant to tax regllations. He testified that taxes might be deferred, or "rolled over," but could not say with
iny certainty how the IRS would rule. There is
10 abuse of discretion if a court refuses to
.peculate about hypothetical future tax consequences of a property division made pursuant
o a divorce. Alexander v. Alexander, 131
5
.2d 221, 224 (Utah 1987). Tax consequences
n this case were speculative as to whether they
:ould be avoided or delayed, and as to
imount. The court heard testimony and evilence regarding possible tax implications, but
lid not err in refusing to adjust property disribution because of those theoretical conseqlences.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's property distor t i o n order but reverse as to the alimony
tward and remand for further proceedings
insistent with this opinion.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
CONCUR:
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
i. Defendant filed an earlier declaration of monthly
'xpenses totaling $4464.62, but included no expenses
or real property taxes or insurance, indicating that
hey were then unknown.

2. "If courts award child support in lieu of permanent alimony, they may fail to anticipate the financial impact on the remaining family as each child
reaches age 18 and his or her award terminates."
March 1990 Utah Task Force on Gender and Justice
Report to the Utah Judicial Council 38.
3. Exact mathematical equality of income is not
required, but sufficient parity to allow both parties
to be on equal footing financially as of the time of
the divorce is required.

BENCH, Judge (concurring in part, dissenting
in part):
I agree with the majority opinion's treatment of the "tax considerations." I also agree
that this case must be remanded for entry of
appropriate findings as to the needs of defendant for alimony and the ability of plaintiff
to pay alimony. I respectfully disagree with
the majority, however, as to how the parties'
standard of living during the marriage impacts
the alimony computations. The majority rules,
as a matter of law, that in computing the
alimony award, the trial court should have
considered a hypothetical standard of living as
if the parties were living together at the time
of trial rather than their actual standard of
living enjoyed prior to separation. 1
There are no cases addressing when the
parties' standard of living is determined
because a "standard of living" cannot, as the
majority implies, be quantified by the trial
court. It is not like marital property which is
capable of objective valuation at a given time.
Nor is it capable of being calculated based on
set figures of income as are child support
payments. Determining the parties' standard
of living during marriage is a fact-sensitive,
subjective task that requires a trial court to
look at the totality of the parties' financial
circumstances during the marriage. The Utah
Supreme Court has therefore established objective factors that must be considered by the
trial court when it determines an award of
alimony.
"The most important function of
alimony is to provide support for
the wife as nearly as possible at the
standard of living she enjoyed
during marriage, and to prevent the
wife from becoming a public
charge." English v. English, 565
P.2d at 411. With this purpose in
mind, the Court in English articulated three factors that must be
considered in fixing a reasonable
alimony award:
[1] the financial condition and
needs of the wife;
[2] the ability of the wife to
produce a sufficient income for
herself; and
[3] the ability of the husband to
provide support.

Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah
1985). Accord Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96,
100-01 (Utah 1986) (failure to consider these
factors is an abuse of discretion); Olson v.
Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566-67 (Utah 1985) (an
appellate court will not disturb a trial court's
ruling if these factors are adequately addressed).
As is apparent from the foregoing quotation, the receiving spouse's previous standard
of living is not an independent factor to be
quantified and incorporated into a formula for
calculating alimony. Rather, it is a frame of
reference for determining the reasonableness
of the alimony award. See generally, 2 H.
Clark, Jr., The Law Of Domestic Relations In
The United States §17.5(8) (2d ed. 1987). In
the present case, we are not concerned with
the risk of defendant becoming a public
charge given the apparent ability of plaintiff
to cover defendant's basic needs. The question
is how much additional support above defendant's basic needs should be granted. The
parties' standard of living prior to separation
helps to establish what would be reasonable by
showing the lifestyle to which the parties have
grown accustomed.
Defendant seeks to benefit from plaintiff's
raise by mistakenly, and unnecessarily, claiming that the raise entitled her to alimony
based upon a hypothetical standard of living
to be calculated from plaintiff's new annual
salary of $120,000, an income to which she
has never grown accustomed. 2 In other words,
defendant claims that her relevant standard of
living is the unknown standard of living that
she might have enjoyed were the parties not
terminating their marriage. Since any attempt
to determine a standard of living for two
separated parties as if they were not separated
would be purely speculative, the majority's
ruling is judicially unworkable. There is no
rational way of knowing how the parties might
have utilized the increased income had they
remained together. Would they have bought a
new car, a new house, or maybe a vacation
timeshare? Or would they have simply saved
the money for retirement? Since a couple's
standard of living is determined in large part
by how they spend their resources, a trial
court could do nothing but speculate about the
possible standard of living if the marital relationship had continued beyond separation.
Not only is such an approach unworkable, it
is not needed if the traditional approach outlined in English is followed. In the present
case, the trial court clearly failed to determine
defendant's financial condition and needs
based on the expenses she claimed to be necessary to maintain the standard of living she
enjoyed during the marriage. See, e.g., Olson,
704 P.2d at 567 ("to maintain the standard of
living enjoyed during the marriage, the living
expenses of the wife and minor children would

be $4,200 per month").
Defendant presented to the trial court evidence of the expenses which she claimed
would be necessary to maintain her standard
of living, but the trial court made no findings
thereon. 3 The trial court should have reviewed
the expenses claimed and determined which
expenses could be deemed reasonable in light
of the standard of living she had enjoyed prior
to the separation. See, e.g., Jones, 700 P.2d at
1075 (the couple had enjoyed a "very comfortable lifestyle/' alimony award of $1,000 per
month was insufficient for wife to "maintain
anything even approaching the standard of
living she enjoyed during the marriage"). Her
reasonable expenses should have then been
offset by her own resources, i.e., any investment income and her own wage-earning
capacity. Only then could the trial court have
made a finding as to defendant's needs.
The trial court should have then gone
through the same analysis as to the plaintiff's
needs and resources in order to determine his
ability to pay. Again, the reasonableness of his
claimed expenses should be reviewed with the
parties' prior standard of living in mind. The
trial court should have then determined
whether plaintiffs resources exceeded his
reasonable needs. At this point the trial court
should have, and in fact did, consider the
impact of the dramatic increase in plaintiffs
income. If plaintiff had not received the raise,
then his ability to pay would be approximately
$4,500 less per month, in which case neither
party would likely be able to enjoy a standard
of living anywhere near their previous standard. Inasmuch as plaintiff's raise has increased his ability to, pay, defendant will be directly benefitted without resort to a hypothetical standard of living to which she had not
grown accustomed.
After determining what resources were
available to the parties to meet their own
reasonable expenses, the trial court should
have considered any imbalance in the prospective standards of living if the parties were left
to support themselves with their own resources. If it were apparent that defendant could
not maintain her previous standard of living
with her own resources, and that the plaintiff
with his dramatically increased income could
maintain a higher standard of living, then the
trial court could have awarded alimony to
raise the standard of living of the defendant.
Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988)
("the ultimate test of the propriety of an
alimony award is whether, given all of these
factors, the party receiving alimony will be
unable to support him- or herself 'as nearly
as possible at the standard of living ... enjoyed
during the marriage,'" quoting English, 565
P.2dat411). 4
Inasmuch as the trial court failed to follow
the foregoing approach, the court abused its
discretion in making the alimnnv award T
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therefore concur with the majority that this
case must be remanded to allow the trial court
to properly consider the established factors
and make appropriate findings. However,
since plaintiffs raise will be fully considered
when his ability to pay alimony is determined,
I believe there is no need to depart from the
established criteria for determining alimony.
The parties' standard of living need not, and
should not, be extrapolated so as to include
speculations about what their standard of
living might have been at the time of trial if
they had not separated. I therefore respectfully
dissent from the majority opinion's legal
ruling on that point.
Russell W. Bench, Judge
1. Contrary to the majority's assertion, the trial
court did not "pinpoint" the parties' standard of
living as of the time of separation. The trial court
took the parties' average income over a five-year
period prior to separation and assumed that their
average income was their "standard of living."
While it is clear that the trial court erred in assuming that income alone establishes a standard of
living, it may not be said that it made the mistake
of pinpointing that standard of living. The majority
therefore errs in finding that the trial court abused
its discretion when the trial court did not even make
the mistake that the majority is accusing it of
making.
2. Defendant claims, and the majority seems to
agree, that defendant is entitled to a larger amount
of alimony because she "persevered during the lean
times." Such an argument does not, however, justify
an amount in excess of the needs substantiated by
the receiving spouse. English, 565 P.2d at 412. The
majority's summary conclusion that the income was
"akin to deferred income," is totally unsupported.
While the parties may have perservered at Western
Airlines during the lean times, there is no evidence
that there was any commitment from Western that
plaintiffs income would increase if and because he
stayed with the airline.
3. Defendant's actual expenses at the time of trial
were likely greatly diminished due to her limited
income at the time. She therefore correctly sought to
present not only her actual expenses during the
separation, but also the expenses she claimed would
be necessary to maintain or, in many cases return
to, the standard of living she enjoyed prior to separation.
4. The alimony award, however, need not be large
enough to maintain the receiving spouse at the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage if that
amount of alimony would lower the standard of
living of the paying spouse below that of the receiving spouse. Alimony may only raise the standard
of living of the receiving spouse until it is roughly
equal to that of the paying spouse. It is in this sense
that alimony should seek "to the extent possible,
[to] equalize the parties' respective post-divorce
living standards." Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d
1331, 1333 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
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IN THE
U T A H COURT OF A P P E A L S
STATE OF UTAH in the interest of M.S., a
person under the age of eighteen years,
v.
Michael SALATA,
Appellant.
No. 900193-CA
FILED: February 28, 1991
Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake
County
Honorable Arthur G. Christean
ATTORNEYS:
Kim Rilling, Salt Lake City, for Appellant R.
Paul Van Dam and Carol L. C. Verdoia,
Salt Lake City, for the State of Utah
Arnold G. Gardner, Jr., Salt Lake City,
Guardian Ad Litem
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Orme.
OPINION
BENCH, Judge:
Michael Salata appeals from an order of the
juvenile court terminating his parental rights
to M.S., his young child.1 We affirm.
Salata suffers from schizophrenia, which
has afflicted him for at least sixteen years. His
condition includes "anti-social traits/' and he
has been repeatedly incarcerated. When not
incarcerated or hospitalized, he has occasionally been homeless. Although Salata has submitted to voluntary hospitalization at least
four times, he generally resists attempts to
treat his illness and sees them as unwarranted
interferences with his life.
In 1987, Salata lived with a woman and
fathered M.S. After birth, M.S. lived with
Salata for several months, but was removed
from Salata's custody after workers from the
Division of Family Services observed unsanitary conditions and a lack of parental care.
Three treatment plans were developed with the
objective of reuniting M.S. and Salata, but
Salata did not fulfill his commitments under
the plans.
The juvenile court found that Salata's
mental illness manifests itself in
(1) A pattern of blaming others
for his misfortunes and an almost
complete inability to recognize any
deficiencies in his lifestyle choices
or parenting abilities.
(2) A persistent denial of any
justification for state intervention
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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BARBARA JOYCE HOWELL,

)
)
)

Defendant.
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Judge Frank Noel
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The
trial

on

above-entitled
Thursday,

the

matter
22nd

came

day

Honorable F r a n k G. Noel p r e s i d i n g .
in person
John

Mason.

represented
considered
into

and r e p r e s e n t e d
The

the

evidence

advisement.

Paul

testimony
and

of

was

determined

Thereafter,

December,

David S.

present

H. L i a p i s .
the

being

the

The p l a i n t i f f

by c o u n s e l ,

defendant

by c o u n s e l ,

of

before

take

advised

for

1988,

the

was

present

Dolowitz

and

person

and

The c o u r t h e a r d

parties,
to

in

court

in

received
the

and

exhibits

matter

the premises,

under
the

court announced its decision in open court on the 19th day of
January, 1989.
of

Fact

and

The plaintiff then submitted proposed Findings
Conclusions

of

Law

and

Decree

to

the

court,

provisions to which defendant objected.

Those objections were

heard

on

and

resolved

before

the

court

April

27, 1989.

Accordingly, the court now makes and enters the following as
its
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The defendant was a resident of Salt Lake County,

State of Utah, when this action was filed and had been so for
more than three months immediately prior thereto.
2,

The

parties

are

husband

and

wife,

having

been

between

the

married on October 14, 1956, in Cushing, Oklahoma.
3.

Irreconcilable

differences

arose

parties which they attempted to reconcile, but were unable to
do so.
4,
marriage;

There were five (5) children born as issue of this
four

(4) are

emancipated.

Both

of

the

parties

agreed that care, custody and control of the one (1) remaining
minor child of the parties, Sean Daniel Howell, born August
21, 1972, age 16, should be awarded to the defendant, subject
to reasonable

rights

of visitation in the plaintiff.

The

defendant is a fir and proper parent to be awarded the care,
custody and control of the minor child of the parties.

5.

At the time of the separation of the parties, the

plaintiff

was

earning

between

$5,500.00

per

month

and

$5, 600. 00 per month and had been earning this sum for five
years prior to -chis time.

After separation,

the plaintiff

filed an action for divorce which he dismissed at trial; that
after

a

two-day

attempted

reconciliation,

he

filed

this

action.
6.

The court believes the income level of $5,500. 00

reflects the income level and living standards of the parties
during the last five years of theii: lives together.
7.

The plaintiff earns, from his present employment,

a salary of $10,000.00 per month.

The court has determined in

setting alimony that while $5,500. 00 per month represents the
living standards of the parties in the last 5 years of the
marriage, when the parties resided together, the ability of
the plaintiff to pay alimony is based upon his present income
of $10,000.00 per month.
8.

The

defendant

earns, or is

capable of earning,

$7, 500. 00 per year, or $625. 00 per month.

At the time of

trial, defendant was employed with Casual Furniture on a parttine

basis

earning

a gross

income

of

$649. 80 per month,

although that employment was scheduled to end on December 31,
1988 and she had not yet secured replacement employment.
9.

Application

of

the
3

Child

Support

Guidelines

adopted by the courts of the State of Utah would require the
payment of child support from the plaintiff to the defendant
in the

sum

of

$1, 363. 00 per

month

based

upon plaintiff s

income of $10,000.00 per month until Sean attains the age of
18 and graduates from high school with his regularly-scheduled
graduating class.
10.

The plaintiff filed separate tax returns in 1986

and 1987 and the defendant has not filed tax returns for those
years.
11.

The parties acquired, during the course of their

marriage, a home and real property located in California, towit:

1767 Calle Rocas, Camarillo, California, which was

zhe

primary residence of the parties prior to their move to Utah
in 1984; a home and real property located in Utah, to-wit:
8241 Top of the World Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah; seven (7)
lots in the state of Texas; interests in a series of pension
plans maintained by the employer of the plaintiff, to-wit:
Western Airlines

and

Delta Airlines,

(these

plans

Western Airlines

Plan A, the Western Airlines

are the

Plan B, the

Western Airlines Plan D, the Delta Plan and the Delta Savings
Plan); and an interest in a military retirement plan, part of
which was earned prior to the marriage; three IRA accounts,
one in the name of the plaintiff for $7,546. 57, a second in
the name of the plaintiff in the sum of $4,196.43 and one in
4

the name of the defendant for $10, 397. 00; bank accounts at
Western Federal Credit Union, Ranier Bank, Valley Bank, Mt.
West Savings, and Camarillo Community Bank; 8. 6023 shares of
Delta

stock;

fixtures,

stock

in

furnishings

Continental
and

Power

appliances;

Co. ;

five

furniture,

guns;

an IBM

computer and software; a 1977 Buick automobile; a 1987 Ford
truck and camper; a 1980 Datsun 280Z; a 1978 ski boat; a 1982
fold boat

and motor;

several

pieces

of ivory;

and

a 35mm

camera,
12.
the

The plaintiff testified that the precise term of

military

United

States

retirement
Navy,

plan is

being

re-examined

by the

as plaintiff was ^ in the Naval Reserve

prior to going on active duty and this period of time should
have been included in the plan calculations but had not, as
of the date of trial, and this determination had been appealed
and was being reviewed by the Navy.
13.

After

separation

of the

parties,

the

plaintiff

withdrew $33,000.00 from a retirement fund which was expended
to pay for marital debts of the parties, to-wit: $16,000.00
to repay a loan $3,400.00 on the VISA account; $12,500.00 to
pay income taxes; $1,000.00 on their daughter's wedding; and
$600.00 to refinance the parties' home.
14.

The parties acquired various

unpaid, to-wit:
5

debts which remain

Tracy Collins Bank
Camarillo Community Bank
Defendant's Personal Loan (attorney's fees)
Camarillo Bank VISA
Nordstroms
Weinstocks
ZCMI
Western Federal Credit Union
Western Federal Credit Union for camper
Security Pacific Solar Loan
Valley Bank VISA
State of California taxes.
15.

The plaintiff has two life insurance policies, one

with Delta Airlines

for $100,000.00 and one with Beneficial

Life Insurance for $100,000.00.
16.

The defendant employed counsel to represent her in

this matter and does not have a ready source of assets from
which she can pay for the services whicff she has secured.
17.
employment,

The

plaintiff

health

and

has

dental

available,
insurance

and

through
will

his

maintain

health and dental insurance for Walter and Sean as long as it
is available through his employment.
From

the

foregoing

Findings

of

Fact,

the

court now

makes and enters the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This court has jurisdiction over the parties and

subject matter of this action.
2.

Each of the parties should be awarded a Decree of

Divorce, terminating the marriage between them on the grounds
of irreconcilable differences.
6

3.

Care, custody and control of the

minor child of

the parties, Sean Howell, should be awarded to the defendant,
subject to reasonable rights of visitation in the plaintiff.
4.

The

plaintiff

should

be

ordered

to

pay

child

support to the defendant for Sean in the amount of $1,363.00
per month until Sean is 18 and graduated from high school with
his regularly-scheduled class.

Payments should be made on the

20th of each month.
5.

The income exemption for Sean should be awarded to

the defendant.
6.

The plaintiff should be ordered to pay alimony to

the defendant based upon the standard of living enjoyed by the
parties at the time of their separation in 1986.

Accordingly,

he should pay her $1,800. 00 per month, one-half on the 5th of
each month;

one-half on the 20th of each month until such

time as she dies, remarries, cohabits with a man to whom she
is not married, or further order of the court.
7.

The

parties

should

divide

the

retirement

plan

benefits acquired by them during the course of their marriage
at the value determined by this court on December 22, 1988, by
appropriate qualified domestic relations order, that is, the
Western Airlines Plan A, Plan B, and Plan D, and the Delta
Savings

Plan

and

Delta

Plan,

which

should

be

effected by

separate orders to implement the provision of the Decree of
7

Divorce.
8.
finally

The military retirement plan of the parties, once
valued

and

the

period

of

service

set,

divided by application of the Woodward formula.

should

be

The plaintiff

should keep the defendant advised as to the progress of this
inquiry and the actions and decisions of the United States
Navy.
9.

Plaintiff should be awarded the IRA in his name at

Merrill Lynch in the amount of $7, 546. 57 and the IRA at the
Western Federal Credit Union of $4, 196.43, and the defendant
should be awarded her IRA in the amount of $10, 397. 00.
10.

The plaintiff should be ordered to maintain the

health and dental insurance that is available to him through
his employment on both Sean and his older brother, Walter, so
long as that insurance is available to him through the age of
21.

Each

of

the

parties

should

pay

one-half

of

any

extraordinary medical, dental, orthodontic or eyecare expense
which is not covered by insurance.
11.

The plaintiff has available to him life insurance

in the sum of $100,000.00.

He should be required to maintain

Matthew and Sean as beneficiaries of that policy until they
attain the age of 21 years or are married.

After that occurs,

he shall be free to name whomever he wishes as beneficiary of
that

insurance.

To

assist

the
8

children

in

assuring

this

coverage, the plaintiff should provide them with the policy
number and name of the insurance company.
12.

The plaintiff should be ordered to cooperate with

the defendant in making available to her all health insurance
benefits for which she can qualify under the COBRA provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code.
13.

The home and real property in California, at 1767

Calle Rocas, Camarillo, California, should be sold

for the

best possible price and at the earliest possible time.
net proceeds

of

sale divided

equally

The

between the parties.

There is presently a debt due to the State of California for
taxes.

If it is determined that those are property taxes,

they should be paid from the proceeds of sale of this property
prior

to

determined
plaintiff
defendant

division

of

the

proceeds

that those are taxes
should

assume

harmless

sale.

If

it is

for any other reason, the

and pay

therefrom.

of

those
The

taxes

and

plaintiff

hold

the

should

be

responsible for the sale of the California home, and should
keep the defendant fully advised as to that transaction, and
the defendant

should

take all actions

necessary

to effect

sale.
14.

The

home

and

real

property

in

Utah

should

be

placed for sale at the best possible price and sold at the
earliest

possible

date.

The
9

plaintiff

should

pay

the

mortgage for the months of February, March and April, 1939,
and if the January house payment has not been made, he should
make

that

payment.

Thereafter,

the

defendant

shall

responsible for those payments if the home is not sold.

be
The

defendant shall be responsible for this sale and shall keep
the plaintiff advised as to that transaction and the parties
shall divide equally the net proceeds of sale.
15.

The 3. 6023 shares of Delta stock and Continental

Po^er Stock should be awarded to the plaintiff.
16.

The parties should sell one of the seven lots in

Texas and divide the net proceeds of sale between them. Each
should be awarded three of the remaining lots.
17.

Each

of

the

parries

have

accumulated

savings

accounts in their own names and they should be awarded those
savings, to-wit: the plaintiff should be awarded the Western
Federal Credit Union account; the Ranier Bank account; and the
Valley Bank account, while the defendant should be awarded the
Mountain West Savings account and the Camarillo Community Bank
account.
18.

The insurance proceeds for the 1977 Buick should

be awarded to the defendant who should also be awarded the
1980 Datsun 280Z.
19.
X-O

^ac

The 1987 Ford truck and camper should be awarded

J J i G l i i L l l l .

10

20.

The

1969

Ford

automobile

The

1978

ski

boat

should

be

awarded

to

Matthew.
21.

should

be

awarded

to

the

defendant.
22.

The 1982 fold boat and engine should be awarded to

the plaintiff.
23.

Each

of

the

parties

should

be

awarded

the

furnishings, fixtures, furniture and appliances in their own
possession with the exception of the IBM computer and computer
software in the plaintiff s possession which should be awarded
to the defendant and the 3 5mm camera which should be awarded
to the plaintiff.
24.

Each of the parties should be awarded one-half of

the ivory collection.
25.

Each

of the parties

should

be

ordered

to make

available family photographs in their possession to the other
for copying.

The photographs should be divided fairly between

them.
26.

The plaintiff has accounted for the $33, 000. 00 he

removed from the retirement to the satisfaction of the court
and no order is entered in regard to those funds which the
court believes are appropriately resolved in the division of
the marital estate as set forth above.
27.

Each of the parties should be ordered to assume
11

and pay the debts in their own name with the exception of the
mortgage provisions set forth above, which, restated, are that
the plaintiff

should pay the mortgage on the California

home

and may use the rent received from the California home until
its sale.

The plaintiff should pay the mortgage payments

the Utah home

for February,

March,

and April,

January payment, if that has not been paid.

on

1989, and the

Thereafter,

the

defendant should be responsible for payment of that debt.
The plaintiff should pay the debts due and owing to:
a.
b.
c.

Weyerhauser Mortgage (Calif, home);
Western Federal Credit Union (pick-up);
Western Federal Credit Union (camper);

d.

Security Facific solar loan;

f.

State of California taxes.

The defendant should pay the debts due and owing to:
a.
b.
C.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
28.
regarding
returns.
secure

Lincoln Mortgage (Utah home);
Tracy Collins Bank;
Camarillo Community Bank;
Personal loan (attorney fees);
Camarillo Bank VISA;
Nordstroms;
Weinstocks;
ZCMI.

The
the

parties
filing

should

of

consult

amended

joint

with
1986

an
and

accountant
1987

tax

If these can be filed and the parties save money and
a

refund

in

excess

received by the plaintiff,

of

the

$2, 500. 00

that

has

they should do so and divide

refunds received in excess of the $2,500.00 which has
12

been
all

already

been

received by the plaintiff.
29.

The plaintiff should be ordered to pay on behalf

of the defendant the sum of $7,500.00 to assist her in the
payment

of

her

attorney

fees within

thirty

(30) days from

entry of the Decree of Divorce.
DATED this

day of

, 1989.

FRANK G. NOEL
District Court Judge
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LAKE COUNTY

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * *

WALTER JAMES HOWELL,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil No. D87-4343
Judge Frank Noel

BARBARA JOYCE HOWELL,
Defendant.
* * * * *

The above-entitled
trial

on

Thursday,

the

matter came before the court for
22nd

day

Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding.

of

December,

1988, the

The plaintiff was present

in person and represented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz and
John

Mason.

The

defendant

was

present

represented by counsel, Paul H. Liapis.
considered
into

the

evidence

advisement.

testimony
and

in

person

The court heard and

of the parties, received

determined

to

take

and

the

exhibits

matter

under

Thereafter, being advised in the premises, the

court announced its decision in open court on.the 19th dayiof
January, 1989.
of

Fact,

provisions

The plaintiff then submitted proposed Findings

Conclusions
of

which

of
the

Law

and

defendant

Decree
then

to

the

court;

objected.

Those

objections were heard and resolved before the court on April
27, 1989.

Accordingly, the court, having made and entered its

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

This court has jurisdiction over the parties and

subject matter of this action.
2.

Each

of

the

parties

is

awarded

a

Decree

of

Divorce, terminating their marriage.
3.
the

Care, custody and control of the

parties,

Sean

Howell,

is

awarded

to

minor child of
the

defendant,

subject to reasonable rights of visitation in the plaintiff.
4.

The plaintiff is ordered to pay child support to

the defendant for Sean in the amount of $1, 363. 00 per month
on the 20th of each month until Sean is 18 and graduates from
high school with his regularly-scheduled class.
5.

The income exemption for Sean is awarded to the

defendant.
6.

The plaintiff is ordered

to pay alimony

to the

defendant in the sum of $1,800.00 per month, one-half on the
5th of each month; one-half on the 20th of each month until
2

II
II

ft

I

J such time as she dies, remarries, cohabits with a man to whom

|l
j| she is not married, or further order of the court,
I
7.
The parties shall divide the retirement

plan

•i

II benefits, valued as of December 22, 1988, acquired by them
I during the course of their marriage by appropriate qualified
domestic relations order, that is, the Western Airlines Plan
A, Plan B, and Plan D, and the Delta Savings Plan and Delta
ji Flan, which shall be effected by separate orders to implement
I the provision of the Decree of Divorce.
8.
j finally

The military retirement plan of the parties, once
valued

and

the

period

of

service

ij divided by application of the Woodward formula.

set,

shall

be

The plaintiff

j shall keep the defendant advised as to **the progress of this
I! inquiry and the actions and decisions of the United States
Navy,
9.

Plaintiff

is

awarded

the

IRA

in

his

name

at

Merrill Lynch in the amount of $7, 546. 57 and the IRA at the
|| Western Federal Credit Union in the amount of $4, 196. 43, and
the defendant is awarded her IRA in rhe amount of $10, 397. 00.
10.
j| and dental

The plaintiff is ordered to maintain the health
insurance

that is available

to him through his

I employment on both Sean and his older brother, Walter, through
[j the age of 21, so long as that insurance is available to him.
Each of the parties shall pay one-half of any extra-

I

3

j ordinary

medical,

dental,

orthodontic

or

eyecare

expense

I which is not covered by insurance.
|

11,

The plaintiff has available to him life insurance

J in the sum of $100,000.00,

He shall maintain Matthew and Sean

as beneficiaries of that policy until they attain the age of
21 years or are married*

After that occurs, he shall be free

to name whomever he wishes as beneficiary of that insurance.
To

assist

the

children

in

assuring

this

coverage,

the

plaintiff shall provide them with the policy number and name
of the insurance company.
12.

The plaintiff should be ordered to cooperate with

the defendant in making available to her all health insurance
benefits for which she can qualify underMihe COBRA provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code.
13.

The home and real property in California, at 1767

Calle Rocas, Camarillo, California, legally described as:
LOT 44, TRACT NO. 1359, in the County of
Ventura, State of California, as per Map
recorded in Book 35, Page 59 of Maps, in
the office of the County Recorder of said
county,
jj shall be sold for the best possible price and at the earliest
ii

jj possible

time.

The net proceeds

of sale shall

be divided

Ii
Jj equally between the parties.

There is presently a debt due to

il the State of California for taxes.
I those

are

property

taxes,

they
4

If it is determined that
shall

be

paid

from

the

proceeds of sale of this property prior to division of the
proceeds of sale.
for

any

other

If it is determined that those are taxes

reason,

the plaintiff

shall

assume

and pay

those taxes and hold the defendant harmless therefrom.

The

plaintiff shall be responsible for the sale of the California
home, and should keep the defendant fully advised as to that
transaction,

and

the

defendant

should

take

ail

actions

necessary to effect the sale.
14.

The home and real property in Utah, at 8241 Top of

the World Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, and the adjacent lot,
legally described as:
(House)
(Lot)

LOT 18, TO? OF THE WORLD #3 SUBDIVISION;

BEG S 84 FT FR NE COR^LOT 17, TOP OF THE
WORLD #3 SUBDIVISION; S 84 FT; E 100 FT;
W 100 FT TO BEG. 0. 2 AC M OR L;

shall be placed for sale at the best possible price and sold
at the earliest possible date.

The plaintiff shall pay the

mortgage for the months of February, March and April, 1989,
and if the January house payment has not been made, he shall
make

that

payment.

Thereafter,

the

defendant

shall

responsible for those payments if the home is not sold.

be
The

defendant shall be responsible for this sale and shall keep
the plaintiff advised as to that transaction and the parties
shall divide equally the net proceeds of sale.
15.

The 8. 6023 shares of Delta stock and Continental
5

Power Stock are awarded to the plaintiff,
16.

The parties shall sell one of the seven lots in

Texas and divide the net proceeds of sale between them. Each
| is awarded three of the remaining lots.
17.
accounts

Each
in

of

their

the
own

parties
names

has

and

accumulated

they

are

savings

awarded

those

savings, to-wit: the plaintiff is awarded the Western Federal
Credit Union account; the Ranier Bank account; and the Valley
Bank account, while the defendant is awarded the
West

Savings

account

and

the

Camarillo

Mountain

Community

Bank

j

|i account.

I!
18. The insurance proceeds for the 1977 Buick are
awarded to the defendant who is also awarded the 1980 Datsun
280Z.
19.

The 1987 Ford truck and camper are awarded to the

plaintiff.
20.

The 1969 Ford automobile is awarded to Matthew.

21.

The 1978 ski boat is awarded to the defendant.

22.

The 1982 fold boat and engine are awarded to the

plaintiff.
23.
fixtures,

Each of the parties is awarded the furnishings,
furniture

and appliances

in their own possession

with the exception of the IBM computer and computer software
in

the

plaintiff s

possession

which

are

awarded

to

the

defendant

and

the

35mm

camera

which

is

awarded

to the

plaintiff.
24.

Each of the parties

is awarded one-half of the

ivory collection.
25.
family

Each of the parties is ordered to make available

photographs

copying.

in

their

The photographs

possession

to

are to be divided

the

other for

fairly between

them.
26.

The plaintiff has accounted for the $33,000.00 he

removed from the retirement to the satisfaction of the court
and no order is entered in regard to those funds which the
court believes are appropriately resolved in the division of
the marital estate as set forth above.
27.
the

debts

Each of the parties is ordered to assume and pay
in

their

own

name

with

the

exception

of

the

mortgage provisions set forth above, which, restated, are that
the plaintiff shall pay the mortgage on the California home
and may use the rent received from the California home until
its sale.

The plaintiff shall pay the mortgage payments on

the Utah home for February, March, and April, 1989, and the
January payment, if that has not been paid.

Thereafter, the

defendant shall be responsible for payment of that debt.
'plaintiff shall pay the debts due and owing to:
a.
b.

Weyerhauser Mortgage (Calif, home);
Western Federal Credit Union (pick-up);
7

The

c.
d.
e.
f.

Western Federal Credit Union (camper);
Security Pacific solar loan;
Valley Bank VISA;
State of California taxes.

and the defendant shall pay the debts due and owing to:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
28.

Lincoln Mortgage (Utah home);
Tracy Collins Bank;
Camarillo Community Bank;
Personal loan (attorney fees);
Camarillo Bank VISA;
Nordstroms;
Weinstocks;
ZCMI.

The

parties

are ordered

to

consult

with

an

accountant regarding the filing of amended joint 1986 and 1987
tax returns.

If these can be filed and the parties save money

and secure a refund in excess of the $2, 500. 00 that has been
received

by the plaintiff,

they shall do so and divide all

refunds received in excess of the $2,500. 00 which has already
been received by the plaintiff.
29.

The plaintiff is ordered to pay on behalf of the

defendant the sum of $7,500.00 to assist her in the payment of
her attorney

fees within thirty

(30) days

from entry of the

Decree of Divorce.
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